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Zusammenfassung*: Das Diskussionspapier befasst sich mit dem Zusammenspiel von 
Demografie und Makroökonomie einerseits sowie von Makroökonomie und Einkommensun-
gleichheit andererseits. Hierzu werden – auf der empirischen Basis des Sozioökonomischen 
Panels (SOEP) von 1984 bis 2010 – verschiedene Schätzgleichungen ökonometrisch herge-
leitet. Konkret werden die makroökonomischen Variablen Inflation, wirtschaftliches Wachs-
tum und Arbeitslosigkeit zunächst zu der demografischen Alterung in Deutschland in Bezie-
hung gesetzt, ehe diese Schätzgleichungen dafür genutzt werden, den Zusammenhang zwi-
schen der personellen Einkommensungleichheit in Deutschland und den genannten makro-
ökonomischen Variablen (zusätzlich zu den exogenen Alterungseffekten) herzustellen. 
Für den empirischen Stützzeitraum (1983-2009) zeigen sich a) ein (leicht) negativer Einfluss 
der demografischen Alterung auf die Inflationsrate, b) ein (schwach) positiver Effekt der Alte-
rung auf das Niveau – nicht aber auf die Zuwächse (Rückgänge) – der Wirtschaftswachs-
tumsraten und c) ein etwas stärkerer positiver Einfluss der demografischen Alterung auf die 
Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenquote. Während die demografische Alterung die gemessene 
Einkommensungleichheit in direkter (exogener) Weise nach oben treibt, sind die Mechanis-
men diffiziler, welche durch die verschiedenen makroökonomischen Kanäle vermittelt wer-
den: So ist die Inflation positiv mit Einkommensungleichheit gekoppelt, Arbeitslosigkeit hin-
gegen negativ. Bezüglich des Wirtschaftswachstums ist ein (schwach) konkaver Effekt auf 
die Einkommensungleichheit festgestellt worden. Aus alledem folgt, dass ceteris paribus die 
demografische Alterung via Inflationsrate und Arbeitslosenquote die bundesdeutsche Ein-
kommensungleichheit tendenziell senkt, was für den empirisch relevanten Wertebereich der 
demografischen Alterung in Deutschland auch auf das Wirtschaftswachstum zutrifft. 
Insgesamt gesehen, ergeben sich aber durch den direkten, exogenen Einfluss der demogra-
fischen Alterung im präsentierten Modell bis 2060 Tendenzen zu einem nennenswerten An-
stieg der Einkommensungleichheit in Deutschland. Diese Tendenz ist in der Projektions-
Variante mit einer stärker alternden Bevölkerung wesentlich ausgeprägter als in der Alterna-
tiv-Variante. 
 
Summary*: The discussion paper is concerned with the interplay between demography and 
macroeconomics on one hand and macroeconomics and income inequality on the other 
hand. For this purpose, several estimation equations are derived by econometric methods 
(on the empirical basis of the 1984-2010 German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) waves). In 
concrete terms, the macroeconomic variables inflation, economic growth, and unemployment 
are at first connected with the German demographic ageing; afterwards, these connections 
are used to produce a nexus between German income inequality and the stated macroeco-
nomic variables (additionally to the exogenous effects of ageing). 
For the empirical periods examined (1983-2009), there have been a) a (slightly) negative 
influence of demographic ageing on the inflation rate, b) a (weak) positive effect of ageing on 
the level – not on the increases (reductions) – of economic growth rates, and c) a somewhat 
stronger positive impact of demographic ageing on unemployment rates. While the measured 
income inequality is upwards directly (exogenously) driven by demographic ageing, the 
mechanisms through the different macroeconomic channels are more difficile: Inflation is 
positively and unemployment negatively correlated with income inequality, and regarding 
economic growth a (slightly) concave effect upon income inequality has been observed. All 
these findings imply that demographic ageing, ceteris paribus and by tendency, diminishes 
income inequality via inflation and unemployment rate, which is also valid for economic 
growth (within the empirically relevant value range for the German demographic ageing). 
But on balance, there is an overcompensating direct, exogenous impact of demographic age-
ing on inequality in the model used in this paper, and this causes tendencies towards a re-
markable increase of German income inequality until 2060. These tendencies are more pro-
nounced in the forecast variant in which a strongly ageing population is assumed. 
 
* Dr. Jürgen Faik ist Geschäftsführer von FaMa – Neue Frankfurter Sozialforschung. Autoren-Kontakt: 
faik@fama-nfs.de. 
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1. Introduction1 
The discussion paper is concerned with the interplay between demography and macroeco-
nomics on one hand and macroeconomics and income inequality on the other hand. For this 
purpose, several estimation equations are derived by econometric methods (on the empirical 
basis of the 1984-2010 German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) waves). In concrete terms, 
the macroeconomic variables inflation, economic growth, and unemployment are at first con-
nected with the German demographic ageing; afterwards, these connections are used to 
produce a nexus between German income inequality and the stated macroeconomic varia-
bles (additionally to the exogenous effects of ageing). 
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 fundamental relationships between demog-
raphy and macroeconomic variables on one hand and between macroeconomics and income 
inequality on the other hand are discussed. Section 3 presents the model used in this paper 
for econometrically analysing the corresponding relationships. These estimates are stated in 
Section 4, and last but not least concluding remarks in Section 5 finish this paper. 
 
 
2. Fundamental relationships 
2.1 Preliminary remarks 
The relationship between demography (or, more precisely, demographic ageing) and income 
inequality works both directly and indirectly through several channels. One of these channels 
is “macroeconomics”. Especially inflation, economic output, and unemployment rates can be 
called in this context. To consider the corresponding indirect relationships, a two-stage pro-
cedure makes sense, i. e.: analysing the relationship between demography and macroeco-
nomics at the first stage and then scrutinizing the connection between macroeconomics and 
inequality in the second round (see, in this context, the lower part as well as the category 
“labour market”, concerning unemployment, in Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Idealised transmission channels of demography on income inequality 
(Socio‐)Demography
Labour market
(Human capital, unemployment, 
labour market participation, …)
Inequality
of the
equivalent household
net incomes
Fertility
Mortality
Tax‐transfer systemMigration
Household structure
Capital market
(Asset meltdown, …)
Macroeconomic level
(Inflation, business cycles, 
growth, …)
Application of income
(Income‐dependent needs, 
consumption, saving, …)
: Population size, population shares, 
household size
: (Equivalent) income, 
(Equivalent) income shares  
Source: Faik 2010, p. 18 (weakly modified by present author) 
                                                            
1 The data of this paper rest on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin). . As a reference for the SOEP data base see, e. g., Wagner, Frick, 
and Schupp 2007. 
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2.2 Inflation 
2.2.1 Demography and inflation 
Because of the age-related discrepancies between gainfully employed persons and pension-
ers and because of the lifetime cyclicality of the individual stock of wealth, one obtains cross-
connections between inflation and demography. Thereby, demographic ageing may have, on 
principle, increasing effects on inflation. This would be the consequence of the increasing 
number of old people which are, in an economic sense, inactive and, therefore, they are con-
sumers without participating in the welfare production of the current period.2 Furthermore, 
demographic ageing may reduce labour supply which may increase wages, and the latter 
may result in higher prices of goods (through an increasing demand for goods and services 
or because entrepreneurs would compensate for the rise in labour costs).  
Thus, there are some arguments in favour of a positive correlation between demographic 
ageing and inflation rate. Contrary to this, a negative correlation could, e. g., occur if the 
growing group of pensioners (“the old”) would have to accept (relatively) low pension adjust-
ments. This would damp the level of the aggregate demand for goods and services which 
would, by tendency, cause a lower price level; that is: reducing the inflation rate. 
 
2.2.2 Inflation and inequality 
Hewlett (1977) already has stated: “Inflation generally aggravates inequality (…)”.3 This must 
be interpreted in the sense that rapid price changes would enhance the relative well-being 
positions of the rich on one hand and worsen the well-being positions of the poor on the oth-
er hand.4 
In this respect, in Mocan‘s (1999) analysis – for US data from the 1970s to the mid-1990s – 
inflation had a progressive influence on the measured income inequality and on its changes 
over time; reasonably, this was only valid for inflation which was not anticipated. A non-
anticipated inflation can influence the distributional relationships between gainfully employed 
persons and pensioners (so-called “pensioners hypothesis” in the case when pensions are 
not adjusted for inflationary losses) or the relationships between the receivers of capital ver-
sus those getting labour incomes (e. g., if employees are defeated by a “monetary illusion”).  
Balac (2008) also examined (monetary) inflation’s impact on income (“wealth”) inequality 
referring to inflation’s redistributive effects. He estimated (linear-logarithmic) regressions with 
several inequality indicators (Gini coefficient as well as Atkinson’s measure with two rather 
extreme settings, one of Theil’s indices, and several income ratios) as dependent variables 
and money supply (operationalized by money stock variables M1 and M2), educational at-
tainment (= attainment of high school graduate or more), and federal fiscal policy (= govern-
mental expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product; at this, the values of the 
real gross domestic product partly used as an instrumental variable) as independent varia-
bles. What showed up was that money supply was a significant driver of inequality where the 
extremities of the income distribution were at a high rate significantly affected by monetary 
inflation.  
On balance, literature gave evidence towards a positive correlation between inflation and 
inequality.5 
                                                            
2 See Lindh, Malmberg, and Petersen 2010, p. 56. 
3 Hewlett 1977, p. 353. 
4 See Hewlett 1977, p. 353. Concerning the positive correlation between inflation and income inequali-
ty (mediated through distributional conflicts underlying the determination of fiscal policy) see also Al-
banesi 2007 as well as (on the assumption of interest-bearing assets within the framework of the 
transacting monetary technology) Cysne, Maldonado, and Klinger Moneiro 2005. 
5 See also Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2005, pp. 41-42. 
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2.3 Growth 
2.3.1 Demography and growth 
Assuming decreasing factor productivities of the older work force, a negative connection be-
tween demographic ageing and (changes in) growth would be plausible. For instance, Hall 
and Stone (2010) discussed such demographic impacts on economic growth, and they dif-
ferentiated between direct and indirect influences. Direct influences are linked to changes in 
total labour input through population growth, through changes in the population’s working-
age share, and via changes in the participation rates of the population in working age. Indi-
rect effects arise from increases concerning the propensity to remain in work among the el-
derly or from changed propensities for societies to innovate and take risks (the latter partly 
emerging from interactions between demography and financial markets). In their empirical 
analysis, especially the direct effects of ageing showed negative effects on economic growth. 
Contrary to the foregoing argumentation, Hori (2009) has shown – within the framework of an 
endogenous growth model – that both life expectancy and consumption externalities in-
crease long-run growth. To establish such a positive connection between societal ageing and 
economic growth, a simplified model is helpful: The labour force only consists of younger 
persons, and only older persons provide the societal capital stock by their capital savings. In 
this case it can be shown that an ageing population increases labour productivity which 
would, ceteris paribus, result in higher economic growth.6 
Thus (and similar to the connection between demographic ageing and inflation), in the scien-
tific debate different hypotheses concerning the impact of demographic ageing on economic 
growth exist. 
 
2.3.2 Growth and inequality 
In literature, the correlation between growth and inequality is intensively considered in both 
directions, as impacts of inequality on growth7 and the other way around that is important in 
our context. 
With respect to this latter causality, Jäntti and Jenkins (2009) stated – on the basis of the 
Gini coefficient – that for Great Britain a low economic growth would hardly produce any 
change of inequality, whereas a high economic growth would generate increases in inequali-
ty. In some sense, this contrasts to the “Kuznets curve” which postulates a U-shaped con-
nection between the amount of total income per capita and income inequality.8  
In the above stated Hori (2009) model, the long-run growth rates effects are negatively corre-
lated with entire inequality. Thus, the indirect (positive) linkage of life expectancy (and con-
sumption externalities) via long-run growth towards income inequality would result in less 
income inequality in this model.  
Berg and Ostry (2011) – to quote another study – aimed at the growth rate spells, i. e. on the 
sustainability of growth, and their connections to income inequality. They found that “(…) 
longer growth spells are robustly associated with more equality in the income distribution.”9 
                                                            
6 See Sveriges Riksbank 2000, pp. 44-47. 
7 See, e. g., Banerjee and Duflo 2000 who empirically generated a concave relationship between 
growth rate and (net) changes in income inequality. See, furthermore, Gobbin, Rayp, and Van de gaer 
2007. 
8 See Kuznets 1955. For an overview about the controversial discussion of the  Kuznets curve  (with 
both negative and positive relationships between growth and inequality in a variety of regression-
based studies) see Lundberg and Squire 2003. 
9 Berg and Ostry 2011, p. 3. 
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Amidst the backdrop of widespread and partly contradictory results regarding the relationship 
between growth and inequality, a somewhat sophisticated picture shows up: While positive 
growth appears to have a clear effect upon the reduction of poverty, and a negative nexus 
between the distribution of wealth and economic growth seems to exist, the relationship be-
tween growth (as an explanatory variable) and inequality seems not well established.10 
 
2.4 Unemployment 
2.4.1 Demography and unemployment 
Calculations of the German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirt-
schaftsforschung; DIW) showed that the German labour supply will presumably remain con-
stant up to 2025. Reasons for this result are a higher statutory pension age in Germany (67 
instead of 65 years), a more difficult access to reduced earning capacity pensions, the end-
ing of special regulations concerning early retirement in the recent past, and a supposed in-
crease in the number of women regularly working compared with the status quo. However, 
after 2025 a diminishment of the German labour force appears plausible: Those farther-
reaching estimations for the German labour supply range between 34 and 37 Mio persons in 
2050 (compared to currently more than 40 Mio persons).11 
Additional extensive labour force estimates of the German Institute for Employment Re-
search (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung; IAB) gave evidence for increases of 
the labour force’s shares for persons aged 50 years and older by nearly 12 percentage 
points until 2050, and for persons 60 years and older from 1 to 3 % during the corresponding 
40 years.12 
Thus, amidst the backdrop of the ageing (and shrinking) German society, in the long run a) 
an ageing of the German work force and b) a scarcity of the production factor labour is pre-
dicted for Germany. The latter could mean a reduction of unemployment so that these find-
ings indirectly support the hypothesis of a diminishment of unemployment in an extensively 
ageing society. For the short run, such an effect will not inevitably occur in Germany – for the 
reasons given above. 
 
2.4.2 Unemployment and inequality 
The issue of unemployment exhibits a relatively close link to social inequality, at least at the 
lower part of the income distribution: Usually the degree of unemployment is positively corre-
lated with (cross-sectional relative) income poverty.  
On principle, the distributional effects of short-term and long-term unemployment must be 
separated from each other. Mocan (1999) decomposed – assuming a stochastic trend – the 
US unemployment rates from 1970 to 1994 into a transitory and into a permanent term. 
Structural unemployment reduced the income shares of the lower 60 % of the income distri-
bution, and, thus, it caused increases in (income) inequality; it raised (income) inequality 
stronger than transitory, i. e. short-term unemployment. 
Hoover, Giedeman and Dibooglu (2009) stated – principally in line with the foregoing findings 
– that increases in unemployment would cause raises in income inequality; negative shocks 
to unemployment had only short-lived positive benefits to income inequality. 
However, if the afore-mentioned hypothesis of a shortage of the German labour supply (see 
Section 2.4.1) and, corresponding with that, of a reduction of unemployment in Germany will 
take place in the future, an increase in the wage-interest relation appears plausible. This 
                                                            
10 See Binatli 2012. 
11 See Schulz 2008. 
12 See Fuchs, Söhnlein, and Weber 2011. 
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could correspond with a tendency towards a reduction of personal income inequality via a 
“levelling” of broad income regions. However, this must not be the case since wage increas-
es might be very unequally distributed amongst employees. Additionally, it appears not im-
plausible that unemployment reductions may increase income inequality because the group’s 
number of persons receiving relatively uniform payments of unemployment benefits would be 
reduced. 
On the whole, there are obviously opposing influences concerning the impact of unemploy-
ment on income inequality, and it is open to empirical debate which of these effects predomi-
nates. 
 
 
3. Model 
3.1 Database 
In the following, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel’s (SOEP) waves from 1984 to 
2010 are used because the SOEP data of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW 
Berlin)13 have been collected since 1984 (in annual intervals), and the latest available wave 
is from 2010. The SOEP data correspond to western Germany until 1991 SOEP and after-
wards to Germany as a whole. The sample sizes are between about 5,000 and around 
12,000 households, and the current number of interviewed persons amounts to approximate-
ly 20,000 persons.14 The participants of the surveys give detailed information on their in-
comes, household compositions, earnings’ and family’s biographies, health, life satisfaction, 
etc. Up to now, nine subsamples have been drawn to capture different sub-populations rep-
resentatively. 
For distributional analyses, two central income variables exist within the SOEP context: 
Monthly household income of the current year and annual household income of the previous 
year so that the query for the latter variable is retrospective. In this study, I use – in accord-
ance with the Canberra Group’s guidelines15 – annual household net income which includes 
households’ income obtained from all sources (including imputed rents) over a one year’s 
period.  
In the SOEP, the following kinds of income and of income deductions are differentiated from 
each other:16 
 income resulting from self-employment and from gainfully employed work (= labour 
income), 
 capital gains (including fictive imputed rents), 
 transfers: private pensions, other private transfers, and public transfers (e. g., pen-
sions from the statutory pension system), 
 income deductions: taxes and social security payments of contribution. 
One convention in the context of the SOEP must be considered: Annual incomes of the pre-
vious year are linked to the socio-demographic population’s structure of the current year 
since both distributional elements (incomes, socio-demography) are related to the same data 
wave and, thus, to the same weighting scheme, etc. Hence, in the following analyses, period 
t corresponds with t+1 SOEP wave; for instance, “1983” means that (retrospective) income 
information stems from 1984 SOEP wave as well as socio-demographic information does.  
                                                            
13 See, e. g., Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007. 
14 See Wagner et al. 2008. 
15 See UN 2011, pp. 26-27. 
16 See, e. g., Peichl, Pestel, and Schneider 2012, pp. 126-127. 
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3.2 Variables 
To capture income-specific economies of scale, the following inequality results are based on 
variable equivalence scales for three income regions generating the relevant welfare variable 
equivalent household net income.17 
Its inequality is measured by the normalised coefficient of variation (= half the squared coeffi-
cient of variation) as a conventional inequality indicator.18 In the regressions below, this indi-
cator is used as dependent variable, and it is abbreviated by HSCV.  
 
As independent variables in the main equation of the model serve  
 the changes of the harmonised consumers’ price index as an indicator for inflation 
(INFLATION; reference year: 2005), 
 the changes of the real per-capita gross domestic product as an indicator for econom-
ic growth (GROWTH; reference year: 2000), 
 the ratio “number of unemployed divided by the sum of unemployed and (civil) em-
ployees” (according to the definition of the German Agency for Labour; Bundesagen-
tur für Arbeit) as an indicator for the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT), and 
 the old-age dependency ratio “persons aged 65 and older divided by persons in the 
age of 20 to 64 years” as an indicator for the demographic development in Germany 
(AGE). 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistic values for these selected variables. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the model’s variables for Germany, 1983-2009 
Variable Arithmetic mean value 
Standard 
deviation N 
HSCV 0.2121 0.05783 27 
INFLATION 1.8860 1.05926 27 
GROWTH 1.6024 1.73564 27 
UNEMPLOYMENT 10.0741 1.61854 27 
AGE 26.7519 3.56126 27 
Source: Present author’s own calculations on the basis of 1984-2010 SOEP and DRV 2012, 
pp. 250, 256, 260, and 262 
 
                                                            
17 For more details, see Faik 2012, pp. 5-7. 
18 Regarding its characteristics see, e. g., Faik 2012, pp. 9-11. 
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Further descriptive information is presented in Figures 2a-2d which illustrate the develop-
ment of these variables over time (1983-2009).19 
 
Figure 2a: Empirical inflation rates and estimated inflation rates (denoted by a tilde) 
                 – Germany, 1983-2009 
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Sources: DRV 2012, p. 250, and present author’s own calculations 
 
Figure 2b: Empirical growth rates and estimated growth rates (denoted by a tilde) 
                  – Germany, 1983-2009 
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Sources: DRV 2012, p. 256, and present author’s own calculations 
 
                                                            
19 By the way: Concerning the estimated values see Section 4.1. 
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Figure 2c: Empirical unemployment rates and estimated unemployment rates (denoted by a 
                 tilde) – Germany, 1983-2009 
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Sources: DRV 2012, p. 260, and present author’s own calculations 
 
Figure 2d: Empirical old-age dependency ratios – Germany, 1983-2009 
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The variables afore-mentioned (HSCV, INFLATION, GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AGE) 
are used in a small model aiming at predicting future income inequality in Germany. For this 
purpose, at first functions between the macroeconomic variables and AGE are postulated: 
 INFLATION = f1 (AGE),  
 GROWTH = f2 (AGE), and 
 UNEMPLOYMENT = f3 (AGE). 
On the basis of these functions, the general prediction equation 
HSCV = g (INFLATION, GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AGE) 
is transformed into 
HSCV = g (f1 (AGE), f2 (AGE), f3 (AGE), AGE) = h (AGE). 
 
The latter equation is utilised to predict future German income inequality based on the fore-
casted values for AGE. Each of the foregoing equations is estimated by OLS. Categorising 
the model’s structure, the model used in this paper is a (regression) model with intervening, 
mediating variables (see Figure 3). This structure reveals the outstanding importance of AGE 
which is motivated by the paper’s main concern, i. e., illustrating the changes of income ine-
quality (HSCV) in an ageing society. 
 
Figure 3: Model’s structure 
AGE
INFLATION
HSCVGROWTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
 
Source: Present author’s own illustration (on the basis of Urban and Mayerl 2011, p. 295) 
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4. Estimates 
4.1 Observation period 
4.1.1 General equation 
For the observation period 1983-2009, the general OLS regression HSCV = g (inflation, 
growth, unemployment rate, old-age dependency ratio) is performed. It results in the follow-
ing equation:20 
HSCV = –0.214*** + 0.012*** INFLATION + 0.004** GROWTH – 0.002*** GROWTH2  
                                        – 0.007*** UNEMPLOYMENT + 0.018*** AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.944; DW = 2.309, i. e., weak negative first-order autocorrelation of 
residuals; ANOVA21 F-value = 88.600***]. 
 
All of the coefficients are highly significant (at least at a significance level of 95 %), and the 
adjusted determination coefficient is extraordinarily high. The Durbin-Watson statistics indi-
cates a negative (first-order) autocorrelation of the residuals; however, this negative autocor-
relation appears weak – compared to the theoretical upper limit in the Durbin-Watson statis-
tics (2.309 versus 2.140).22 Furthermore, the ANOVA F-value suggests a very high (joint) 
significance for the combination of the estimated coefficients.  
As is illustrated by the following correlation matrices (Tables 2a and 2b), there are some 
hints for the problem of multicollinearity.23 But, as it is well-known24, for forecasting purposes 
– the main goal of this paper – this problem is not as relevant as for causal analyses (which 
are of minor concern in this paper). 
Table 2a: Zero-order correlation descriptives between the model’s variables (N = 27) 
Variable HSCV 
INFLA-
TION GROWTH
UNEMPLOY-
MENT 
AGE 
Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient 
HSCV 1.000 0.034 -0.238 0.160 0.914 
INFLATION 0.034 1.000 0.232 -0.401 -0.264 
GROWTH -0.238 0.232 1.000 -0.178 -0.385 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.160 -0.401 -0.178 1.000 0.355 
AGE 0.914 -0.264 -0.385 0.355 1.000 
      
Sig. (onesided) HSCV X 0.434 0.116 0.212 0.000 
INFLATION 0.434 X 0.122 0.019 0.092 
GROWTH 0.116 0.122 X 0.187 0.024 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.212 0.019 0.187 X 0.035 
AGE 0.000 0.092 0.024 0.035 X 
      
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
                                                            
20 Out of a range of possible estimation equations this equation performed best. Alternate estimations 
may be found in the Appendix. In every estimation equation presented * denotes a significance level of 
90 %, ** one of 95 %, and *** one of 99 %. 
21 ANOVA = Analysis of Variance 
22 This position is confirmed by Urban and Mayerl 2011, 266. 
23 For instance, the VIF values (VIF = Variance Inflation Factors) in Table 2b are higher than 1 – the 
case of independency. However, all of the empirical VIF values are considerably lower than the (up-
per) critical value of 5.0 (according to a “thumb rule” by Urban and Mayerl 2011, p. 232). Equivalently, 
the tolerance values in Table 2b are above their critical level of 0.25, the latter – and values below this 
limit – being an indicator for problematic collinearity (see, once more, Urban and Mayerl 2011, p. 232).  
24 See, e. g., Stocker 2012, pp. 240-241. 
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Table 2b: Correlation descriptives and collinearity statistics between the model’s coefficients 
Model 
Correlations Collinearity statistics 
Zero order Partial 
Semi-
partial Tolerance VIF 
INFLATION 0.034 0.672 0.193 0.779 1.284 
GROWTH -0.238 0.460 0.110 0.805 1.243 
GROWTH2 0.031 -0.586 -0.154 0.692 1.446 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.160 -0.583 -0.153 0.554 1.804 
AGE 0.914 0.974 0.916 0.681 1.469 
VIF = Variance Inflation Factor 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
 
Figure 4 visually confirms the relatively good adjustment of the empirical HSCV values 
through the estimated HSCV values over the time span 1983-2009. 
 
Figure 4: Empirical and estimated income inequality in Germany, 1983-2009, depending on 
               a  general function between inequality (HSCV) and inflation (INFLATION), growth 
               rate (GROWTH), unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT), and old-age 
               dependency ratio (AGE) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Excursus 
 
Since the data belong either to western Germany (1983-1991) or to Germany as a whole 
(1992-2009), structural discontinuities might play a role. To test for them, separate regres-
sions for both time periods are performed:25 
 
1983-1991 (western Germany): 
HSCV = 0.571 + 0.007 INFLATION + 0.023 GROWTH – 0.004 GROWTH2  
                                        + 0.007 UNEMPLOYMENT – 0.020 AGE 
[N = 9; R2adj = 0.289; DW = 2.680, but too few observations to compute DW test sta-
tistics; ANOVA F-value = 1.651]. 
 
1992-2009 (Germany as a whole): 
HSCV = -0.211*** + 0.011* INFLATION + 0.004 GROWTH – 0.003*** GROWTH2  
                                          -  0.008* UNEMPLOYMENT + 0.018*** AGE 
[N = 18; R2adj = 0.949; DW = 2.143, i. e., weak negative autocorrelation of residuals; 
ANOVA F-value = 64.572***]. 
 
The computed F-statistics is (for these two separate regressions in relation to the entire ob-
servation period): 
 Femp = [{0.013 – (0.001 + 0.002)}/6] / [(0.001 + 0.002)/(27 – 12)] ≈ 8.33. 
Compared with the critical F-value (95 %-level, N = 27, k = 6) in the amount of approximately 
2.455, the empirical F-value is higher. Thus, the null hypothesis (“No structural discontinui-
ties”) must be refuted, i. e., there are substantial differences between the two time periods 
considered. Thereby, it must be kept in mind that the estimates for the period 1983-1991 
(western Germany) are very bad; partly this is attributed to the small number of observations 
(only 9 years!). Apart from this statistical (sample-size) problem, in my eyes the differences 
between the two periods considered are less due to German unification’s effects but rather 
due to the different role the old-age dependency ratio plays: As can be seen by the above 
Figure 2d, especially in the 1980s demographic ageing was not really observed in Germany 
(as a consequence of the “baby-boomer” effect dating from the 1960s) – in contrast to the 
1990s and the first decade of the new millennium. Thus, this is, in my eyes, the main struc-
tural difference between both periods. 
 
End of excurses 
                                                            
25 By the way: Further equations for different (“sliding”) time periods, each of them consisting of 14 
years, may be found in the Appendix. 
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4.1.2 Special equations 
Regarding the macroeconomic variables as functions of demography (operationalized by the 
old-age dependency ratio), the following (best fitted26) equations are estimated (for Germany, 
1983-2009): 
 
(1) ln (INFLATION) = 0.078*** AGE – 0.002* AGE2 
[N = 26; R2adj27 = 0.366; DW = 1.314, i. e., no first-order autocorrelation of residuals28; 
ANOVA F-value = 8.521**]29: 
 
Figure 5a: Estimated relationship between INFLATION and AGE 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
This functional course is obviously characterized by an increase of the inflation rate 
up to an old-age dependency ratio in the amount of 20 %, then by decreasing effects 
on the inflation rate of the old-age dependency ratio, and at the end – starting at an 
value of the independent variable in the amount of about 70 % – by convergence to 
zero. For recent empirical values in Germany – measured from the 1980s on – the 
decreasing area of the above function is relevant, i. e. that in Germany demographic 
ageing has a declining impact on the inflation rate (at least in our simple model with 
only one covariate, AGE). The latter also manifested itself in the above Figure 2a 
which has depicted the estimated inflation values over time (in comparison with the 
empirical inflation rates). 
                                                            
26 Alternate “special equations” are presented in the Appendix. 
27 In a model without a constant, R2adj measures the share of variability in the dependent variable 
through the origin that can be explained by regressions. This procedure is not comparable to the 
R2adj’s in models with a constant, and this must be kept in mind regarding the special equations with-
out intercept (see, e. g., Stocker 2012, p. 7). 
28 In equations without an intercept as the foregoing equation, the Durbin-Watson test must be per-
formed according to a procedure proposed by Farebrother 1980. 
29 Dividing the entire time period into the years before 1992 and into the years from 1992 on, the re-
gressions are: years <= 1991: ln (INFLATION) = 0.030 AGE + 0.001 AGE2 [N = 38, R2adj = 0.744, DW 
= 0.909, F = 56.261***]; years >= 1992: ln (INFLATION) = 0.075* AGE - 0.002 AGE2 [N = 19, R2adj = 
0.361, DW = 1.408, F = 6.361***]. 
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(2) ln (GROWTH) = 0.203*** ln (AGE) 
[N = 23; R2adj = 0.645; DW = 1.615, i. e., no first-order autocorrelation of residuals; 
ANOVA F-value = 42.806***]30: 
 
Figure 5b: Estimated relationship between GROWTH and AGE 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
The old-age dependency ratio exerts an increasing influence on economic growth in 
Germany. However, the changes of the slope are negative so that the corresponding 
curve is increasing on a diminishing scale. This was also indicated by the above Fig-
ure 2b in which the estimated growth rates have been compared with the empirical 
growth rates during the period from 1983 to 2009. 
                                                            
30 For the periods in front of 1992 and from 1992 on, one obtains the following separate regression 
equations: years <= 1991: ln (GROWTH) = 0.266*** ln (AGE) [N = 19, R2adj = 0.601, DW = 1.765, 
F = 29.562***]; years >= 1992: ln (GROWTH) = 0.164*** ln (AGE) [N = 19, R2adj = 0.515, DW = 2.084, 
F = 16.941***]. Obviously, the elasticity of GROWTH with respect to AGE decreased during the time 
period after the German unification compared to the period in front of the German unification. 
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(3) ln (UNEMPLOYED) = 0.700*** ln (AGE) 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.996; DW = 0.301, i. e., positive first-order autocorrelation of residu-
als; ANOVA F-value = 6,113.080***]31: 
 
Figure 5c: Estimated relationship between UNEMPLOYMENT and AGE 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
As with respect to economic growth (see above), the old-age dependency ratio influ-
ences the German unemployment rate positively but on a diminishing scale. This is 
also reflected by the above Figure 2c that compared the estimated and the empirical 
unemployment rates from 1983 to 2009 with each other. 
 
 
                                                            
31 For the time period in front of the German unification (<= 1991) the corresponding regression equa-
tion is as follows for western Germany: ln (UNEMPLOYMENT) = 0.540*** ln (AGE) [N = 18, 
R2adj = 0.885, DW = 0.569, F = 138.977***]. The regression equation for the time period after the Ger-
man unification (>= 1992) is: ln (UNEMPLOYMENT) = 0.713*** ln (AGE) [N = 18, R2adj = 0.996, 
DW = 0.332, F = 4,060.259***]. Comparing these two time periods with each other indicates that the 
elasticity of UNEMPLOYMENT with respect to AGE increased during the time period after the German 
unification. 
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4.1.3 Substitutions 
In order to predict future German income inequality, the estimators of the three (“special”) 
equations afore-mentioned are used as substitutes for the independent variables in the gen-
eral equation above stated (in Section 4.1.1). In this context, it must be noted that this kind of 
substitution is not perfect since the substitutes are derived from OLS regressions that do not 
tell the whole story concerning variations in the used macroeconomic variables (primarily 
meaning that the macroeconomic variables are not solely influenced by demographic age-
ing). Despite this drawback, the substitution procedure mentioned is applied; it yields: 
HSCV = –0.214 + 0.012 exp (0.078 AGE – 0.002 AGE2) 
                         + 0.004 exp (0.203 ln (AGE)) – 0.002 [exp (0.203 ln (AGE))] 2  
                                        – 0.007 exp (0.700 ln (AGE)) + 0.018 AGE. 
 
Since different functional specifications (with different sample sizes) are used for the general 
equation and for the three special equations, the previous model is only a “modified mediator 
model” (MMM). The “original” regression model with mediating variables (OMM) would have 
resulted in the following equations (in our case): 
Special equations: 
INFLATION = 3.984** - 0.078 AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.032; DW = 0.792, i. e., positive first-order autocorrelation of residu-
als; ANOVA F-value = 1.868] 
 
GROWTH = 6.626** - 0.188** AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.114; DW = 1.325, i. e., no decision regarding first-order autocorrela-
tion of residuals possible; ANOVA F-value = 4.358**] 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT = 5.762** + 0.161* AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.091; DW = 0.317, i. e., positive first-order autocorrelation of residu-
als; ANOVA F-value = 3.596*] 
 
General equation: 
HSCV = -0.240*** + 0.014*** INFLATION + 0.003 GROWTH 
                – 0.003 UNEMPLOYMENT + 0.017*** AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.918; DW = 2.329, i. e., weak negative first-order autocorrelation of 
residuals; ANOVA F-value = 74.245***] 
 
Compared to the bivariate regression of HSCV with respect to AGE: 
HSCV = -0.185*** + 0.015*** AGE 
[N = 27; R2adj = 0.829; DW = 1.758, i. e., no first-order autocorrelation of residuals; 
ANOVA F-value = 127.4425***], 
the three mediating variables INFLATION, GROWTH, and UNEMPLOYMENT are working as 
suppressor variables. This is true because the AGE coefficient in the bivariate regression is 
lower than the AGE coefficient in the general equation above (0.15 < 0.17). Together, the 
three mediating variables account for about -0.02 units of the AGE coefficient with about half 
of this (negative) value corresponding with the indirect INFLATION effect (= -0.0011; indirect 
GROWTH effect = -0.0006, indirect UNEMPLOYMENT effect = -0.0005). 
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Figure 6 shows the estimated structure of OMM (and the coefficients’ values on the arrows). 
Figure 6: “Original mediator model” for Germany, 1983-2009 (estimates) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
The following Figure 7 presents for Germany, 1983-2009, the empirical HSCV values in 
comparison to the estimated HSCV values – the latter according to the general (reduced) 
MMM equation.32 
 
Figure 7: Empirical and estimated income inequality in Germany, 1983-2009, depending on 
               a general function between inequality (HSCV) and old-age dependency ratio 
               (AGE) – “modified mediator model” 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
                                                            
32 For reasons of comparison, Figure A.1 in the Appendix also contains the estimates of OMM (which 
are, by construction, identical to the estimates of the bivariate model with AGE as the only independ-
ent variable). It becomes evident that the OMM curve is (nearly) parallel to the MMM curve with negli-
gible lower HSCV values in the OMM case. But, on the whole, the OMM case produces approximately 
the same image as the MMM case in Figure 7 does. 
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The statistical bias, which results from the effects of the unexplained variance in the special 
equations stated in Section 4.1.2, leads to some kind of divergence between the calculated 
HSCV values according to the general equation presented in Section 4.1.1 and the HSCV 
values on the basis of the above “substitution equation” (within the framework of MMM)33, as 
was already stated. However, these differences appear, to my assessment, tolerable (see, in 
this context, Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Estimated income inequality in Germany, 1983-2009, depending on general 
               functions between inequality (HSCV) and inflation (INFLATION), growth rate 
               (GROWTH), unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT), and old-age dependency 
               ratio (AGE) as well as between inequality (HSCV) and old-age dependency 
               ratio (AGE) – “modified mediator model” 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
 
4.2 Forecasts 
The “substitution equation”, presented in Section 4.1.3, is used for predictions with respect to 
German income inequality until 2060. In this context, the 12th coordinated population’s fore-
casts of the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) are taken as a basis. In 
concrete terms, two alternate population scenarios serve as inputs for the above forecast 
equation (through the old-age dependency ratios the German Statistical Office has explicitly 
and implicitly calculated):34 
                                                            
33 The same is true for the OMM case (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix). By the way, see Figure A.3 in 
the Appendix for a comparison between the comprehensive “modified” and the comprehensive “origi-
nal” model with macroeconomic variables as independent variables within the general equations for 
ex-post estimates of HSCV for Germany, 1983-2009. 
34 In this context, see www.destatis.de/genesis (access at 2012-09-18). 
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 Variant 3-W2 (relatively young population): increasing birth frequency, on average, 
up to 1.6 children per woman in 2025 and subsequently constancy of this level until 
2060; increasing life expectancy at birth to 89.2 years for girls and to 85.0 years for 
boys in 2060; life expectancy at the age of 60 years: 30.1 further years for women 
and 26.6 further years for men; migration at balance: +200,000 persons p. a.; 
 variant 6-W1 (relatively old population): decreasing birth frequency, on average, up 
to 1.2 children in 2060; increasing life expectancy at birth to 91.2 years for girls and 
to 87.7 years for boys in 2060; life expectancy at the age of 60 years: 32.1 further 
years for women and 29.2 further years for men; migration at balance: +100,000 
persons p. a. 
 
As is illustrated in Figure 9, up to 2020 both variants lead to very similar distributional results. 
But after that period, both curves diverge: Whereas in variant 6-W1 inequality steadily in-
creases up to HSCV ≈ 1.0 in 2060, in variant 3-W2 inequality only grows until 2035, and from 
this point of time on, it nearly remains stable at a HSCV level in the amount of about 0.75.35  
 
Figure 9: Income inequality in Germany, 1983-2060, depending on two forecast scenarios 
                – “modified mediator model” 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
                                                            
35 Figure A.4 in the Appendix illustrates that there are only slight differences between the MMM and 
the OMM case concerning the predicted HSCV values. 
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As expected36, a decomposition of inequality (see the following Figures 10a and 10b) shows 
that in both variants, by tendency, the predicted inequality rises until 2060 are mainly driven 
by more or less parallel movements of the exogenous effects of the old-age dependency 
ratios over time. Contrary to this finding, the constant in the general equation permanently 
diminishes inequality by -0.214 HSCV points. Something like that is principally true for the 
growth effects on inequality from 2030 on, and for the unemployment rate’s effects over the 
entire time interval (1983-2060). Concerning the inflation rates, slightly positive impacts on 
HSCV are measured until 2039 but with a negative slope, and between 2040 and 2060 the 
HSCV contributions of the inflation rates converge to zero. The latter means that in our mod-
el the inflation rates do not affect inequality very much until 2039, and not at all from 2040 to 
2060. On balance, the exogenous demographic influences overcompensate the other four 
effects mentioned – in the direction of increasing income inequality in Germany over time. 
The exogenous demographic effects on inequality are working directly or are mediated 
through the other channels sketched in Figure 1 but not through the “macroeconomic chan-
nel(s)”. 
 
Figure 10a: Decomposition analysis for predictors of income inequality within variant 3-W2 
                   – Germany, 1983-2060 (“modified mediator model”) 
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Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
                                                            
36 See, e. g., the above Figure 6 regarding the suppressor effects of the mediating macroeconomic va-
riables.  
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Figure 10b: Decomposition analysis for predictors of income inequality within variant 6-W1 
                   – Germany, 1983-2060 (“modified mediator model”) 
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5. Concluding remarks 
For the empirical periods examined (1983-2009), there have been a) a (slightly) negative 
influence of demographic ageing on the inflation rate, b) a (weak) positive effect of ageing on 
the level – not on the increases (reductions) – of economic growth rates, and c) a somewhat 
stronger positive impact of demographic ageing on unemployment rates. While the measured 
income inequality is upwards directly (exogenously) driven by demographic ageing, the 
mechanisms through the different macroeconomic channels are more difficile: Inflation is 
positively and unemployment negatively correlated with income inequality, and regarding 
economic growth a (slightly) concave effect upon income inequality has been observed. This 
implies that demographic ageing, ceteris paribus and by tendency, diminishes income in-
equality via inflation and unemployment rate, which is also valid for economic growth (within 
the empirical relevant values for demographic ageing in Germany). 
Despite some sensitivity of results depending on different functional specifications, on differ-
ent time periods, etc., the following (rough) causalities may be postulated: 
1. Demographic ageing  Macroeconomics 
1.a Demographic ageing reduces inflation rate’s level. 
1.b Demographic ageing increases growth rate’s level. 
1.c Demographic ageing increases unemployment rate’s level. 
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2. Macroeconomics –> Income inequality 
2.a Inflation increases income inequality. 
2.b Growth reduces income inequality. 
2.c Unemployment reduces income inequality. 
 
3. Demographic ageing  Macroeconomics  Income inequality 
3.a Demographic ageing reduces income inequality through lower inflation rates. 
3.b Demographic ageing reduces income inequality through higher growth rates. 
3.c Demographic ageing reduces income inequality through higher unemployment 
rates. 
 
However, it must be kept in mind that the sample sizes, usable in the regressions of this pa-
per, are not very large so that the foregoing findings should be interpreted with caution. Fur-
thermore, it must be stressed that the stated causalities are based on empirical data for the 
time period 1983-2009, and it is not clear whether they are appropriate or not for predicting 
future German social structures which probably will be characterized by a much stronger 
demographic ageing than hitherto (not at least because the German “baby boomers” of the 
1960s will fall into the category “old” in the (near) future). Especially the mediating variable 
UNEMPLOYMENT is crucial since a massive demographic ageing may run short German 
labour supply and may, therefore, reduce unemployment rates; this could lead, ceteris pari-
bus, to higher income inequality (and not to lower inequality as is indicated by the estimates 
of this paper). 
However, on balance, there are – via the direct impact of demographic ageing on inequality 
in the model presented in this paper – tendencies towards a remarkable increase of German 
income inequality until 2060. These tendencies are more pronounced in the forecast variant 
in which a strongly ageing population is assumed.  
The findings of this paper strengthen the results presented in Faik (2012) where different 
scenarios concerning future German income inequality (until 2020) are presented.37 In that 
older paper, other channels than the macroeconomic ones are addressed. Thus, the findings 
of this new paper may be interpreted as complementary support for the evidence created by 
Faik (2012). 
 
 
                                                            
37 Faik 2012, p. 46, mentioned as inequality-increasing elements: forward projections of current within-
group inequalities, the reduction of average household size, longitudinal changes in relative income 
positions of the (future) elderly, a longitudinal tendency towards higher inequality within the younger 
cohorts, an increase of cohort-specific homogamy, and heritages. Contrary to that, he labelled as ine-
quality-decreasing factors: forward projections of current relative income positions as well as an as-
sumed scarcity of the labour supply (causing changing wage-interest relations). Last but not least, he 
was indifferent regarding the future inequality effects of the following variables: demographic ageing in 
terms of different age groups’ population shares, the prospective increased societal importance of 
transfers and capital gains, and redistribution in old age via the tax system. Insofar, the direct AGE 
effects in the above models can be partly interpreted as effects of mediator variables – others than the 
ones considered in this paper. But this requires a more elaborated paper and is beyond the scope of 
this paper which is concerned with the relationships between macroeconomic variables (or: the mac-
roeconomic framework) and personal income inequality. 
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Appendix 
 
I. Alternate general equations 1983-2009 
1. HSCV = -0.240*** + 0.014*** INFLATION + 0.003 GROWTH – 0.003 UNEMPLOYMENT 
                  +0.017*** AGE    [R2adj = 0.918] 
2. ln (HSCV) = -3.528*** + 0.065*** INFLATION + 0.009 GROWTH 
                        – 0.008 UNEMPLOYMENT + 0.071*** AGE    [R2adj = 0.928] 
3. ln (HSCV) = -3.452*** + 0.060*** INFLATION + 0.012 GROWTH – 0.006 GROWTH2 
                        – 0.019* UNEMPLOYMENT + 0.073*** AGE    [R2adj = 0.938] 
4. ln (HSCV) = -7.584*** + 0.096*** ln (INFLATION) – 0.021 ln (GROWTH)  
                        – 0.260** ln (UNEMPLOYMENT) + 2.004*** ln (AGE)    [R2adj = 0.943] 
5. ln (HSCV) = -7.624*** + 0.095*** ln (INFLATION) – 0.005 GROWTH – 0.005* GROWTH2  
                        – 0.287*** ln (UNEMPLOYMENT) + 2.038*** ln (AGE)    [R2adj = 0.943] 
 
 
II. Sliding “time windows” (each “time window” equals 14 years) 
Dependent 
variable: 
HSCV 
Independent variables: R2adj 
Time 
period 
Constant INFLATION GROWTH GROWTH2 UNEM-
PLOY-
MENT 
AGE  
1983-1997 +0.294 +0.007** +0.004 +0.000 +0.005 -0.008 0.349
1984-1998 +0.353 +0.008** +0.005 -0.000029 +0.005 -0.010 0.590
1985-1999 +0.066 +0.009*** +0.004 -0.001 +0.001 +0.003 0.445
1986-2000 -0.048 +0.010*** +0.004 -0.001 -0.001 +0.009 0.493
1987-2001 -0.165** +0.012*** +0.004 -0.002 -0.003 +0.014*** 0.641
1988-2002 -0.238** +0.011* +0.002 -0.001 -0.006 +0.018*** 0.732
1989-2003 -0.197 +0.011 +0.003 -0.002 -0.005 +0.017*** 0.732
1990-2004 -0.172* +0.009 +0.001 -0.001 -0.005 +0.016*** 0.820
1991-2005 -0.229** +0.012* +0.002 -0.001 -0.004 +0.017*** 0.876
1992-2006 -
0.226*** 
+0.012* +0.002 -0.002 -0.003 +0.017*** 0.905
1993-2007 -
0.215*** 
+0.017** +0.006 -0.003 -0.005 +0.017*** 0.945
1994-2008 -
0.196*** 
+0.022** +0.003 -0.003 -0.008* +0.017*** 0.959
1995-2009 -0.194** +0.022** +0.001 -0.002* -0.008* +0.017*** 0.959
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III. Alternate special equations 1983-2009 (t = time period – 1983) 
 
1. Inflation 
a) INFLATION = 3.984** - 0.078 AGE    [R2adj = 0.032] 
b) INFLATION = 38.383** - 2.541* AGE + 0.043* AGE2   [R2adj = 0.032] 
c) INFLATION = 9.562* - 2.341 ln (AGE)    [R2adj = 0.041] 
d) INFLATION = 56.459** - 3.764** AGE + 0.062** AGE2 + 0.080 t    [R2adj = 0.141] 
e) INFLATION = 56.288** - 3.762** AGE + 0.062** AGE2 + 0.086 t + 0.000 t2  [ R2adj = 0.102] 
f) ln (INFLATION) = 0.152*** ln (AGE)  [ R2adj = 0.344] 
 
 
2. Growth 
a) GROWTH = 6.626** - 0.188** AGE    [R2adj = 0.114] 
b) GROWTH = 5.720 – 0.123 AGE - 0.001 AGE2   [R2adj = 0.078] 
c) GROWTH = 18.970** - 5.297** ln (AGE)    [R2adj = 0.149] 
d) GROWTH = 2.973 – 0.052 ln (AGE) – 0.092 t    [R2adj = 0.113] 
e) GROWTH = -119.640* + 38.225** ln (AGE) +0.382 t – 0.039** t2   [R2adj = 0.234] 
f) GROWTH = -44.005 + 14.759 ln (AGE) – 0.012* t2   [R2adj = 0.181] 
g) GROWTH = 14.367 – 3.634 ln (AGE) – 0.355 ln (t)   [R2adj = 0.094] 
 
 
3. Unemployment 
a) UNEMPLOYMENT = 5.762** + 0.161* AGE    [R2adj = 0.091] 
b) UNEMPLOYMENT = -93.011*** + 7.232*** AGE – 0.124*** AGE2   [R2adj = 0.516] 
c) UNEMPLOYMENT = -5.981 + 4.897* ln (AGE)    [R2adj = 0.112] 
d) UNEMPLOYMENT = 3.075*** ln (AGE)   [R2adj = 0.978] 
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Figure A.1: Actual income inequality versus income inequality in the “modified” and in the 
                  “original mediator model” case for Germany, 1983-2009 
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Multiple: macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables indirectly considered, single: only AGE as 
an explanatory variable considered 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
Figure A.2: Actual income inequality versus income inequality in the “original mediator 
                   model” case for Germany, 1983-2009 
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Multiple: macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables indirectly considered, single: only AGE as 
an explanatory variable considered 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
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Figure A.3: Income inequality in the “original” and in the “modified mediator model” case 
                 (both in terms of structural equations) for Germany, 1983-2009 
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“Partly non-linear” reflects a quadratic GROWTH term (MMM case), “purely linear” corresponds with 
the OMM case. 
Source: Present author’s own calculations 
 
Figure A.4: Income inequality in Germany, 1983-2060, depending on two forecast scenarios 
                  and on different “mediator models” 
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